

already complex treatment under control. This brings up another point: the more conservative variations of pragmatism do get underemphasized in this attempt to tell the story of the growth and dynamism of pragmatism. Hilary Putnam, for example, is notable by his absence from this collection: only Ralph Sleeper takes time to paint a quick portrait of Putnam as Yesterday's Man. It would be wise to remember David A. Hollinger's counsel, 'If pragmatism has a future, it will probably look very different from its past, and the two may not even share a name' (31).

Some contributions from familiar commentators do disappoint. Larry Hickman's essay, for example, exhibits the dryness of prose for which Deweyans have become infamous: a poor tribute to a philosopher often unfairly accused of being unduly technical. David Hollinger, on the other hand, contributes a lively historical account of the milieu of the early pragmatists. His is also one of the most philosophically perceptive contributions to this book. Similarly, Daniel J. Wilson offers an engaging account of the fusion between logical positivism and the pragmatism of the thirties and forties, showing how the new ideas from Europe shaped not only pragmatist thought but the larger self-image of professional philosophy.

This middle period marks the decline of social activism among pragmatists, and this abandonment of its progressivist heritage is explored by Bruce Kuklick in 'American Philosophy and Its Lost Public'. His treatment, and that of other contributors, of this shift in pragmatism's sense of social calling is handled in a very balanced fashion: a refreshing change from recent debates. Rickard Donovan's treatment of 'Richard Rorty and the Linguistic Turn' nicely rounds out the transitional moments of pragmatism's changing face. These essays chronicling such transitions constitute some of the most useful parts of the book from a pedagogical point of view.

There are some interesting essays contrasting various personalities in the pragmatist family, but they are less appealing, perhaps because they embody a continuation of family squabbles: George Cotkin's psychobiographical approach to the differences between the philosophies of James and Rorty is particularly hard to swallow. Isaac Nevo does a better job resuscitating James against Quine's claims to be the first holistic empiricist, but in the end he brings Rorty into the fray and his own position seems to cloud the debate unnecessarily.

To judge this volume as a whole, one must applaud the ambitious project undertaken by the editors: they clearly deserve a good deal of the praise for the success of this collection. A balanced representation of 'tender' and 'tough-minded' pragmatic writers, a blend of historical treatments and consideration of specific pragmatic themes and thinkers makes this one of the most well-rounded books on pragmatism in recent years. A meagre index is offset by an exceptionally complete bibliography, and the book's single noticeable typo suggests further editorial industry. This one is definitely worth one's time.

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Terence Horgan and John Tienson
Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology.

Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 1996.

Pp. xiii + 207.

US\$35.00. ISBN 0-262-08248-9.

Horgan and Tienson (H&T) have produced what is simultaneously a compelling introduction to connectionism, a philosopher-friendly guide to the details, and a platform for their own promising and original ideas.

The central thrust of the book is this: classical cognitive science has some things right, and some things wrong. (A familiar tune, I agree — but whistled well.) What classicism has *right* is that mental representations must have syntactic structure, where said structure bears upon cognitive processing. Otherwise, Fodor and Pylyshyn's worries about systematicity, semantic coherence, etc. will go unanswered; in addition, H&T argue, the ability to track enduring individuals through changes of properties/relations would be lost without mentalese 'subjects' and mentalese 'predicates'; and, finally, they maintain that deductive reasoning demands mental syntax.

But, they charge, classicism gets it *wrong* in supposing that cognitive processing is achieved by hard programmable rules — cognitive transitions, they insist, are not tractably computable. In brief, H&T want classicism's representations, but not its rules: they'll take the Language of Thought, but they have little use for the Computational Theory of Mind. (Note however that, as becomes clear in Section 5.1, H&T's notion of syntactic structure, and hence their variant of LOT, is importantly non-classical: it allows for constituency, but not via the part-whole relationship. This section of the book, even taken alone, is worth the price of admission.)

Of course an obvious question arises with respect to their representations-without-rules picture: how does syntax do its causal work, if not by means of exceptionless rules which avert to structure? H&T's response to this challenge, though sometimes sketchy, is intriguing. They suggest that there are 'cognitive forces' interacting in a 'dynamical system'. These forces sometimes compete, and sometimes cooperate — and each is overridable. The result of this complex interaction are 'soft laws' for the system as a whole — the only kind of laws psychology can have; and, they argue forcefully, the only kind it needs. Put in terms of Marr's three levels, their idea is this: algorithms, the so-called 'middle level', are replaced by mathematical state transitions of a dynamic kind. The result is that, at the top-most conceptual level (Marr's 'computational level') the state transitions are non-deterministic — hence all generalizations at this level are ineliminably *ceteris paribus*. This, they insist, is precisely the result we want.

However plausible their proposal, H&T's reasons for rejecting old-style rules will not convince the committed classicist. The central premise of their argument against strict classicism is that human cognition exhibits a kind of open endedness which, H&T submit, cannot arise from hard rules. They

write: '... paraphrasing Descartes, it is for all practical purposes impossible for a machine to have enough different programs to make it act in all the contingencies of life in the way in which our reason makes us act' (35). But, first, they never make clear precisely *why* programs cannot give rise to such 'open endedness'; nor do they explain why Descartes' polemics, against materialism, go wrong. How, one wonders, do Descartes' arguments fail, if their argument works? And yet, while they fail to show that it *cannot* succeed, H&T ably demonstrate the disappointments and broken promises of rule-based cognitive science — enough anyway to justify exploring an alternative.

In sum, *Connectionism and Philosophy of Psychology* offers an engaging and plausible mixture of classical and connectionist insights. If you've ever wondered what connectionism was all about, but didn't have the time to get the background; or, if you've thought about teaching connectionism, but didn't know how... Buy this book. If you know the basics, but get lost in vectors, tensor products and threshold functions... Buy this book. Finally, if you're familiar with connectionist systems, but fear that they could never achieve systematicity, productivity, etc.; if you suspect there's something right about classicism, but something wrong as well... Buy this book.

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Internationalism and its Betrayal.

Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press
1995. Pp. ix + 180.

US\$44.95. ISBN 0-8166-2469-0.

Internationalism — or, as some prefer to call it, universalism — is once again under attack. Perhaps the most explicit challenge comes from the likes of Richard Rorty, of the University of Virginia, who has recently defended a form of epistemological parochialism, the view that truth and meaning derive from the community of which one who thinks and uses language is a member.

Ishay, who is on the faculty of the Graduate School of International Studies at Denver University, traces the development of the internationalist movement from early Greek thought through the ensuing 25 centuries, arguing that in the last analysis the natural law, natural rights way of understanding politics and diplomacy has been betrayed in Western intellectual circles. In the end it is Hegel who best illustrates Ishay's thesis. As she notes, 'by viewing the Volkstaat as the panacea, Hegel ended up promoting the

Prussian state over the claim of the international project, the particular over the universal' (128).

This observation is pregnant with the gist of Ishay's broad claim: what undermined the universalist or internationalist project is the reaffirmation of the particular, especially via individualism. Even though Ishay acknowledges that collectivist internationalist ideas such as socialism also collapsed, so that she ends on an utterly pessimistic note to the effect that 'internationalism remained an empty illusion, an idea condemned to the life of abstraction, a dream betrayed by even its staunchest defenders' (129), she tends to hold individualism responsible for the movement's alleged demise.

As is rather typical of books that grow out of dissertations, this work is rather dry and lackluster as far as bold theses are concerned. Talk about abstraction: everything in this work takes place on the intellectual plane, as if human politics had no chance of being influenced by the concrete facts of nature! Furthermore, there is a habit of painting with an incredibly broad brush that's displayed in this book. Grand sweeps of ideas — by Aristotle, Vico, Burke and Fichte, to name just a few — govern human history. If ever there is someone who embraces Hegel's notion of the work of Absolute spirit, whether intentionally or not, Ishay appears to be a good candidate. So without any bold thesis argued up front, what we have is occasional hints at Ishay's own ideology — as when she laments, albeit rather quietly, Kant's, Paine's and Robespierre's refusal to banish private property rights from their universalist agenda, which she claims 'implicitly privileged the position of the initially advantaged bourgeois' (72). Had the book been a bit more ideologically gutsy, we might have learned how Ishay would avoid the tyrannical implications of every attempt thus far of redistributing property so that no such privilege would obtain. What about the privilege of those who would accomplish the redistribution? And what else but the right to private property manages to be so accommodating to the universalist agenda of tolerance for diversity? These would have been valuable themes to explore but the book leans too far toward the low key approach to launch into these matters.

Internationalism and Its Betrayal is divided into Preface, Introduction, and three parts, with a foreword by Craig Calhoun that tries to relate the subject matter of the book to certain concrete current events. Part One considers mostly Grotius, Vico, and Rousseau, Part Two Kant, Paine, and Robespierre, and Part Three Burke, de Maistre, and Fichte. The conclusion focuses on Hegel, arguing that it is in him that we are able to witness the full and tragic demise of the internationalist project.

This is an informative work, with thinkers treated very fairly and even rather thoroughly, given the scope and length of the project, both of which render that task quite challenging. The way Ishay makes it happen is to bring out a side of many of the major players that we do not usually find discussed, for which the reader must be grateful. Indeed, this is a big virtue of the book: it lets us in on seldom discussed aspects of the views of major political thinkers, ones that are nevertheless of recurring concern to all who hope to find